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Abstract 
 
The Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) initiative is an evaluation framework directed at 
improving the international standing of Australian research. It is a particular variant of a performance 
based research funding system conceptualised and implemented under recent higher education 
reforms of the Australian Labor Government. The expectation of the Rudd/Gillard Labor 
governments has been that ERA will have a transformational impact on universities via its focus on 
comparative, international indicators of quality research. This summary positions ERA within a 
complex web of policy trends and initiatives that have dominated Australian higher education over 
several decades. It considers the policy history of government-institutional relations and the 
emergence of the enterprise university as the context for increased accountability. It then provides 
some insight into the rationale behind more recent reforms through an examination of the shifting 
foundations of quality in higher education before offering some brief reflections on university 
governance and ERA. 
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ERA and the performance regime in Australian Higher Education:  
A review of the policy context 
Case study: The Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) Initiative 
The performance instrument  
In 2008, Senator Kim Carr announced a new metrics based, research evaluation initiative, the 
Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA), to be developed by the Australian Research Council 
(ARC) in conjunction with the Australian Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and 
Research (DIISR). The Senator (Carr, 2008a) stated that: 
Australia is about to embark on a transparent, workable system to assess the 
quality of home-grown research... For the first time we will be able to 
measure our achievements against our peers around the world, and plan the 
future of research investment. The Commonwealth invests billions each year 
in research. The ERA model will provide hard evidence that taxpayers are 
getting the best bang for their buck in this critical area. (¶ 3-5) 
The initiative has now become embedded within Australian university life and has been argued to 
represent: 
a full-scale transformation of Australian universities into a culture of 
audit…[that] threatens to alter and in all likelihood undermine the capacity 
for universities to produce innovative and critical thought. To say this is not 
to argue that these things will no longer exit, but that they will decline as 
careers, research decisions, cultures of academic debate and reading are 
distorted by ERA. (Cooper & Poletti, 2011, p. 57) 
Accordingly, ERA has been met with trepidation by some members of the university research 
community as a consequence of its perceived capacity to radically alter the working lives, careers 
and fields of research for Australian academics (Kwok, 2013). 
The first ERA process was undertaken in 2010, the second occurred in 2012 and expected thereafter 
every three years. This process requires institutions to collect data from individual researchers on 
their research activity aligned to eight discipline clusters. Data collected across the eight discipline 
clusters are allocated to two- and four-digit Field of Research (FoR) codes, as identified in the 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification (ABS & Statistics NZ, 2008). The 
four-digit code serves as the Unit of Evaluation (UofE) although if there is insufficient research 
activity to meet the minimum threshold needed for analysis, the data is aggregated and then 
evaluated at the two-digit level. In order to report on the disciplines at the national level, evaluation 
occurs across universities at the two-and four-digit levels.  
As research within these clusters can occur across a number of faculties or research centres, it is 
necessary for each institution to coordinate the collected data in order for the university submission 
to accurately portray its research activity. Consequently, expert groups are utilised to provide 
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strategic advice on how to present the data to the ARC. These groups are able to draw on a 
confidential citation benchmark document, provided by the ARC to submitting institutions. 
Following submission, the ARC, through its appointed expert panels of peers, evaluates the collected 
data to develop a national outcome report on institutional performance in each of the discipline 
clusters at both four and two digit levels, based on a 1-5 scale. This rating scale is argued to be 
“broadly consistent with the approach taken in research evaluation exercises in countries to allow for 
international comparison where appropriate” (Australian Research Council, 2011c, p. 5). The ERA 
2010 scale is described in Table 1. 
The Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) aims to: 
1. Establish an evaluation framework that gives government, industry, business and the wider 
community assurance of the excellence of research conducted in Australia’s higher education 
institutions. 
2. Provide a national stocktake of discipline-level areas of research strength and areas where there is 
opportunity for development in Australia’s higher education institutions. 
3. Identify excellence across the full spectrum of research performance. 
4. Identify emerging research areas and opportunities for further development.  
5. Allow for comparisons of Australia’s research national and internationally for all discipline areas. 
(Australian Research Council, 2011c pg.1) 
Table 1. ERA rating scale 
Rating Descriptor 
5 
The Unit of Evaluation profile is characterised by evidence of outstanding 
performance well above world standard presented by the suite of indicators used 
for evaluation. 
4 
The Unit of Evaluation profile is characterised by evidence of performance above 
world standard presented by the suite of indicators used for evaluation. 
3 
The Unit of Evaluation profile is characterised by evidence of average 
performance at world standard presented by the suite of indicators used for 
evaluation. 
2 
The Unit of Evaluation profile is characterised by evidence of performance below 
world standard presented by the suite of indicators used for evaluation. 
1 
The Unit of Evaluation profile is characterised by evidence of performance well 
below world standard presented by the suite of indicators used for evaluation. 
n/a 
Not assessed due to low volume. The number of research outputs does not meet 
the volume threshold standard for evaluation in ERA. 
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These evaluations of research performance are made against four categories of indicators drawing on 
principles described as being “valid and robust”(Australian Research Council, 2008 pg.1) measures 
of research quality for a particular discipline. The four categories (Australian Research Council, 
2011c pg. 2) are: 
1. Indicators of research quality. 
2. Indicators of research volume and activity. 
3. Indicators of research application. 
4. Indictors of recognition. 
The reference period for research quality covers six years of research outputs, while all other 
indicators are aligned to a three year time frame. Table 2 displays the variations in the core indicator 
between ERA 2010 and ERA 2012 and their associated reference periods. 
Table 2. ERA core indicators in 2010 & 2012 
 2010 (Australian 
Research Council, 
2011c pg.2) 
Reference 
period 
2012 (Australian 
Research Council, 2011b 
pp. 9-10) 
Reference 
period 
1 Quality 
evaluated by: 
Ranked outlets, citation 
analysis, ERA peer 
review, peer-reviewed 
Australian and 
international research 
income 
Jan. 2003-
Dec. 2008 
(6 years) 
Publishing behaviour, 
citation analysis, ERA peer 
review, and peer- reviewed 
Australian and international 
research income 
Jan. 2005-
Dec. 2010 
(6 years) 
2 Volume and 
activity evaluated 
by: 
Total research outputs, 
research income and 
other research items 
within the context of the 
profile of eligible 
researchers 
Jan. 2006- 
Dec. 2008 
(3 years) 
Total research outputs, 
research income and other 
research items within the 
context of the profile of 
eligible researchers 
Jan. 2008- 
Dec. 2010 
(3 years) 
3 Application 
evaluated by: 
Research 
commercialisation 
income and other applied 
measures 
Jan. 2006- 
Dec. 2008 
(3 years) 
Research 
commercialisation income, 
Plant Breeder’s Rights, 
registered designs, and 
NHMRC guidelines. Some 
other measures such as 
publishing behaviour and 
some other categories of 
research income can also 
provide information about 
research application 
Jan. 2008- 
Dec. 2010 
(3 years) 
4 Recognition 
evaluated by: 
A range of esteem 
measures 
Jan. 2006- 
Dec. 2008 
(3 years) 
A range of esteem 
measures 
Jan. 2008- 
Dec. 2010 
(3 years) 
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The UofE are assessed against the indicators by eight, discipline specific, Research Evaluation 
Committees, guided by journal and citation benchmarks provided by the Australian Research 
Council (Australian Research Council, 2011a). In 2010, this benchmarking drew on three 
bibliometric measures: 
1. Relative citation impact (RCI), calculated against Australian HEP [higher education 
providers] and world benchmarks 
2. Distribution of articles against RCI classes 
3. Distribution of articles based on world centile thresholds and Australian HEP average. 
(Australian Research Council, 2011a, p. 1)  
The ARC draws on Scopus, an abstract and citation database, to provide citation information. As 
well, Australian benchmarks were developed from compilations of indexed journal articles from the 
2010 submissions.
1
  
Development 
With the launch of ERA, Australia initiated its third interpretation of a performance-based research 
funding (PRF) system (Hicks, 2012) cementing its commitment to a global trend. Hicks’s analysis of 
fourteen international PRF systems identified several challenges to their design. These included the 
use of peer review and metrics, the accommodation of differences across research fields, lengthy 
consultation with the academic community, the transparency of data and access to results as well as 
recognition of the dynamic consequences of the evaluation process (Hicks, 2012).  
To some extent, the design of ERA has attempted to overcome some of these challenges with varying 
degrees of success. For example Hicks (2012) argues that the use of databases such as Scopus 
privileges scientific fields over the social sciences and the humanities and is therefore problematic, 
however the highly consultative nature of ERA reflects an attempt at procedural fairness. Unlike 
other countries, despite the general rhetoric of transparency and accountability, ERA data is 
unavailable due to confidentiality issues (Sheil, March 2, 2011) and “weightings given to various 
components of information available to committees are not known” (Hicks, 2012 pg. 256). As such, 
the global report card on the design of ERA is still somewhat uncertain. However, as no single, 
ideological model currently exists for PRF systems (Hicks, 2012), ERA represents a particular 
Australian variant of a higher education performance management system.  
Prior to ERA, Australia had evaluated research initially through the Composite Index and the 
Research Quality Framework (RQF) described in more detail below. As the unit of analysis are 
research fields and it employs peer review informed by bibliometric measure, ERA as a variant of 
PRF has been argued to be the state-of-the-art (Hicks, 2012). Although funding is relatively low, and 
sits beside other PRF arrangements, Hicks comments that this forefront in Australia’s design:  
                                                 
1
 Full details of the derivation and calculation of the citation benchmarks is detailed in (Australian Research Council, 
2011a) 
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incorporates highly consultative processes in which the government gathers 
input from universities using comment periods, and evaluation processes 
designed by expert panels made up of representatives of university or field-
based associations. (2012 pg.255) 
Significantly, ERA 2010 as the first full scale implementation of the initiative, employed weighted 
categories of journals. This journal ranking process involved scholarly communities deciding on the 
most suitable metrics for their fields. This consultation resulted in the 2008 release of a list 
containing over 19,500 journals assigned to 181 FoR codes (Lamp, 2009). Each journal was assigned 
a single rank of excellence (A*, A, B or C). The list was eventually converted to a database and made 
available on the internet where it received 64,000 hits over a six month period from both domestic 
and international visitors (Lamp, 2009). It has been argued that the ARC had stated that it would use 
discipline specific tiered journal rankings as an indicator of research quality 
2
, the implication being 
that ERA ranked journal was the gauge of excellence (Lamp, 2009). At the time, Lamp believed that 
the ranking exercise would provide institutional motivation to apply pressure on their academics to 
publish in highly ranked outlets. He argued that:  
the investment of effort by the ARC into creating and maintaining this list 
will compel them to get maximum return on that investment by expanding its 
use. Either way, a change in publishing behaviour by Australian academics 
can be expected...The ERA journal ranking exercise has the potential to 
dramatically change the landscape of academic publishing in Australia. The 
precise nature and extent of those changes are yet to be made apparent. The 
process is being watched keenly in other countries and the mere existence of 
the journal ranking list is significant and could have wider effects. (2009, p. 
829) 
Although journal rankings were positioned as just one indicator for research evaluation in ERA 2010, 
it received considerable critical attention across the Australian academic community. This extended 
beyond the concerns held for its effects on journal publishers, to issues concerning the academics 
decision making in relation to careers and fields of study (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Cooper & Poletti, 
2011; Hardy, Heimans, & Lingard, 2011; Haslam & Koval, 2010; Young, Peetz, & Marais, 2011). In 
a survey of academics within the field of employment relations, Young et al. (2011) reported that “84 
per cent [claimed] that the ERA journal ranking had replaced traditional decision-making or 
evaluative criteria” (p. 80). Such findings suggest a shift from the traditional form of autonomy held 
by researchers to one motivated by institutional objectives.  
In response to the concerns over the journal rankings, Margaret Sheil as the CEO of the ARC was 
reported (Rowbotham, 2010 November 3) as saying:  
“We codified a behaviour that was there anyway”, she said “Our rankings 
made it easier for senior people to say to researchers: ‘You are not publishing 
in good enough journals’”. But she did not approve of pressure being applied 
                                                 
2
 See http://www.arc.gov.au/era/era_2010/archive/era_journal_list.htm 
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in this way. “Universities are using it in ways that are more rigid than I 
would,” she said. “If I was back in a university, I would not be trying to use it 
for purposes other than what was intended”. (¶ 7) 
Accordingly, it would seem that the ARC was aware of the motivating potential of the journal 
rankings for institutions as a driver of quality improvement despite an acknowledgement that this 
was resulting in perverse effects. The codification of behaviour in this instance is presented as the 
tool through which institutions would be empowered to control its academic staff, yet this control of 
the organisation is also argued to be beyond the reach of the ARC.  
Following the publication of the ERA 2010 report, the ARC opened the 2012 journal list for public 
consultation (from February 14 to April 4, 2011). By May, in response to received feedback, the 
government announced that it would refine “the journal quality indicator to remove the prescriptive 
A*, A, B and C ranks” (Carr, May 30, 2011) and introduce journal quality profiles. The publication 
profile would indicate “the most frequently published journals for each unit of evaluation” (Carr, 
May 30, 2011, p. 2). Senator Carr commented that: 
There is consistent evidence that the rankings were being deployed 
inappropriately within some quarters of the sector in ways that could produce 
harmful outcomes. One common example was the setting of targets for 
publication in A and A* journals by institutional research managers…The 
journals lists will still be of great utility and importance, but the removal of 
the ranks and the provision of the publication profile will ensure they will be 
used descriptively rather than prescriptively. (May 30, 2011, pp. 2-3)  
This sudden turn around on such a prominent component of the initial ERA process, suggests that 
although the ARC had acknowledged potential risks, they may not have been fully prepared for the 
perverse effects of the ERA ranking. In addition, this marks a departure from international trends in 
weighting journals in PRF systems. 
In general, Hicks’ analysis of PRF systems suggests some concern with the costs and benefits of 
these evaluation processes. This is particularly difficult as the exercise incurs “indirect costs for 
universities that compile submissions and direct costs for the evaluation of those submissions” 
(Hicks, 2012, p. 256). More significantly, Hicks argues that PRF systems can pose additional 
pressure on governments to increase research funding, particularly from those universities who have 
demonstrated their outstanding research ranking.  
Of interest to Hicks is the connection between PRF systems and the relatively small financial 
rewards for universities attached to performance. Here she argues that the main motivator for 
performance is less about the financial incentives and more about the competition for a prestigious 
ranking, stating that “Universities compete for prestige, and PRFSs harness this” (2012, p. 258).  
Finally, Hicks asserts that the introduction of PRF systems “creates tensions between autonomy and 
control (2012, p. 258), both in relation to institutions and individuals. Specifically, she mentions the 
example of ERA’s wide and extensive consultation with the academic community occurring within 
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the boundaries established by the ARC. In addition, she refers to the belief that PRF systems provide 
a mechanism to restrict self-autonomy through the enhancement of “disciplinary elites” (2012, p. 
259).  
Utilisation of ERA data 
The national dataset made possible from the ERA evaluations is used in a number of ways. Primarily, 
ERA informs decisions in relation to the Sustainable Research Excellence (SRE) program, the 
Research Training Scheme (RTS) and the Government’s compacts with universities, which are 
briefly outlined below. In addition ERA is used to inform the Governments Research Workforce 
Strategy and more indirectly the minimum research standards developed by the Tertiary Education 
Quality Standards Authority (TEQSA). 
Sustainable Research Excellence (SRE) Program 
The SRE program emerged from the policy paper Powering Ideas: An innovation agenda for the 21
st
 
Century (DIISR, 2009), directed at harnessing Australia’s research potential to drive international 
competitiveness whilst receiving “the highest possible dividend from its investment” (DIISR, 
2011b). The initiative provides a block grant to cover the shortfall in indirect costs of competitive 
grant research (Australian Competitive Grant- ACG). As a block grant, funds are allocated on a 
performance based formula. The SRE program is directed at: 
 [increasing] the number of research groups performing at world-class 
levels; and 
 [supporting] high quality universities that can deliver world class 
research that drives and supports innovation now and in the future.  
In particular...SRE’s focus is to: 
 support and build research excellence; and 
 secure the sustainability of research over the longer term. (DIISR, 
2011b, p. 4) 
Accordingly, the SRE is designed to meet infrastructure costs of research as well as build 
institutional capacity, develop research quality and extend research performance. In this respect, the 
SRE distinguishes itself from other block grants with its recognition that “achieving research 
excellence on a sustainable basis is dependent on a university’s capacity to strategically manage its 
resources to meet the costs associated with research activities” (Ratnatunga & Waldmann, 2010, p. 
2). Consequently, the program provides financial incentives and mechanisms to effect institutional 
change.  
Following consultation with the higher education sector, several models were proposed as to how 
ERA, in conjunction with a Transparent Costing (TC) exercise 
3
, would be utilised to establish the 
funding formula (Ratnatunga & Waldmann, 2010). Funding allocated for 2012 and 2013 is derived 
                                                 
3
 A framework for identifying indirect costs associated with Australian Competitive Grants.  
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directly from ERA outcomes of 2010, while the methodology for 2014 allocations draws from ERA 
2012. The eventual model announced in 2012 provides additional funding for those universities who 
participated in the TC and the ERA processes (threshold 1) and a further share in funding for those 
institutions receiving an ERA FoR score of 3 and above (threshold 2). ERA scores of 1 or 2 receive a 
zero weighting in the allocation of this proportion of the SRE funding formulae. Accordingly, 
institutions not only receive financial incentives for participating in ERA, but are also advantaged by 
high scores in the FoR ranking.  
Research Training Scheme (RTS) 
The RTS is a block grant serving as a tuition scheme for postgraduate study. Introduced in 1999, the 
initiative, in combination with the Institutional Grant Scheme, brought performance-based funding to 
research and research training (Larkins, 2011). The funding formula applied to the scheme is heavily 
influenced by performance indicators, “leading to the desired consequences of differentiated research 
income” (Moses, 2007, p. 270) across institutions. 
Following from Minister Carr’s Powering Ideas policy agenda, the Government proposed a 
substantial injection of funding in the scheme to develop a research workforce with viable careers. 
Accordingly, a review of the RTS was initiated resulting in the release of a consultation paper, 
Defining Quality for Research Training in Australia (DIISR, 2011a) directed at identifying 
meaningful measures to drive improvement. This was to be followed by a second paper specifically 
detailing how ERA outcomes would be used to allocate RTS funding (DIISR, 2011a). 
4
 
However, Palmer (2011) argues that the Government has conflated the quality of research and 
performance measures of research training, and then linked this to the ERA process. Here the 
Government has stated that:  
A key part of providing HDR [Higher Degree Research] students with a 
quality training experience is ensuring that they are learning in an 
environment where quality research is taking place. Excellence in Research 
for Australia (ERA) provides an improved mechanism to assess the quality 
and scale of research activity undertaken at higher education institutions. 
(DIISR, 2011a, p. 17) 
Palmer (2011) argues that as ERA does not include the publication activity of research students and 
only appears to give some indication that a critical mass of potential supervisors exist at particular 
institution, it will struggle to provide even indirect measures of research training by virtue of its 
design. In this respect, even though ERA does not measure the quality of research training, it appears 
that ERA data will be used as a proxy. Accordingly, Palmer (2011) also states that the use of ERA to 
determine funding of research student places or scholarships could result in perverse incentives 
rather than improvement in the quality of research training.  
                                                 
4
 The ERA 2012 submission guidelines indicate that outcomes will inform funding of research training (ARC, 2011, p. 
10). 
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Mission-based compacts 
In 2009, the Government released the discussion paper Mission-based Compacts for Universities: A 
framework for discussion (DEEWR & DIISR, 2009), describing a funding initiative that would: 
mark the start of a new relationship between the Government and higher 
education institutions. It will be based on mutual respect, trust and shared 
goals to improve students’ educational experience and outcomes and to build 
research capacity and international competitiveness. (DEEWR & DIISR, 
2009, p. 1) 
The compacts are composed of three parts: 1) a mission statement and details as to how the 
institution would fulfil that mission; 2) a teaching and learning component outlining their 
commitment to national priorities and targets for performance funding; and 3) a research component 
addressing national priorities in research and research training as well as detailing how funding 
would be used to meet institutional and government policy objectives (DEEWR & DIISR, 2009).  
Accordingly, the compacts serve as a negotiation tool between universities and the Government to 
identify performance targets that would “trigger reward payments” (DEEWR, 2009, p. 47) and 
facilitate “a streamlined funding and accountability framework” (DEEWR & DIISR, 2009, p. 5). 
Here the incentive payments are linked to the SRE program and therefore indirectly to the weighting 
of the ERA scores and the Collaborative Research Networks (CRN) program designed to link 
smaller universities to institutions with greater research capacity and success. The accountability and 
performance aspect is addressed through the Government’s monitoring and evaluation of institutions 
and the annual production of portfolios on each university, drawing on multiple sources of statistical 
data including ERA outcomes.  
The compacts discussion paper (DEEWR & DIISR, 2009) argued that as the compacts would allow 
for the negotiation of funding based on: 
a university’s performance and their agreed indirect costs of research. This 
will lead to changes in the distribution of block funding and drive greater 
institutional differentiation. Over time this will be reflected in universities’ 
mission statements, funding bids and overall performance. (p. 7) 
Accordingly, the compacts serve as a possible tool to drive differentiation towards a multi-layered 
higher education sector (Hare & Trounson, February 02, 2011) to distinguish teaching focused from 
research intensive universities. Thus, ERA outcomes identify those institutions that could partner 
with poor performing universities in order to build research capacity.  
Tertiary Education Quality Standards Authority 
Established under the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Act 2011, the Tertiary Education 
Quality Standards Authority (TEQSA) is the newly formed regulatory body with responsibility for 
establishing higher education standards and the auditing and accreditation of universities. All higher 
education providers are required to register with TEQSA whose role it will be to monitor provider 
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standards, qualification standards, teaching and learning standards, information standards and 
research standards. 
Although TEQSA has yet to produce the Research Standards, ERA data is expected to play a role in 
monitoring the standards administered by TEQSA and the academy has been left to wonder how 
ERA will be utilised. In a 2010 newspaper article it was reported that: 
Margaret Sheil said that ERA rating scale had been recalibrated, creating 
more differentiation at the lower end, partly with a view to its future use by 
TEQSA (Lane, September 09, 2010). 
Accordingly, while the role of ERA in TEQSA’s research standards is still uncertain, it would appear 
that the ARC are making preparations for its data to be used for benchmarking.  
Part 1- Policy context  
In a 2010 speech to the Australian Technology Universities Network, Minister for Innovation, 
Industry, Science and Research Senator Carr, provided some insight into the Government’s policy 
strategy when he stated that: 
ERA will have a huge impact on the higher education sector – a 
transformational impact. This is not a curiosity-driven exercise. We are not 
gathering data for [the] sake of it. We expect the lessons we learn from ERA 
to change the culture and drive reform across the system…This may well 
influence academic mobility, publication preferences, student enrolments, 
and the capacity of institutions to secure external funding. [Universities] are 
wrestling with the question of what ERA might mean for [their] capacity to 
attract researchers, research students, overseas undergraduate students, and 
foreign investment in university-based research. This is precisely the kind of 
question I want you thinking about. Every university in the country should be 
asking itself how the results of ERA will make it look internationally. If the 
answer is ‘not too flash’, then it will be my turn to ask questions, starting 
with ‘What are you going to do about it?’. (Carr, 2010, p. 3) 
Accordingly, the Government has expectations that the ERA process will: (a) serve as the 
mechanism for fundamental change across Australian universities; (b) have effects in a wide range of 
areas that may or may not be directly linked to research outputs; and (c) provide international 
performance benchmarks against which universities will be held to account.  
This policy summary broadly touches on many of these issues in an attempt to position ERA in the 
complex web of policy trends and initiatives that have dominated Australian higher education. It 
begins by considering government-institutional relations, coordinating and buffering bodies and the 
emergence of the enterprise university as the policy context for increased accountability. This is 
followed by part two that provides some insights into the rationale behind the Rudd/Gillard reforms 
via an examination of the shifting foundations of quality assurance in Australian higher education. 
The summary concludes with some brief reflections on university governance and ERA.  
ERA 
   
12 | P a g e  
 
Commonwealth-Institutional relations  
Higher education in Australia is predominated by autonomous universities as statutory bodies, 
established under Federal, State or Territory
5
 legislation. There are 39 publicly funded and two 
private universities as well as one Australian branch of an overseas institution. Constitutionally, 
universities are the responsibility of the States and Territories, however funding responsibility 
remains with the Commonwealth government who finances student places and provides research 
funding through competitive and block grants
6
 under the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (The 
Parliament of the Commowealth of Australia, 2003). Therefore, the Commonwealth as the primary 
source of university funding, able to exert considerable influence on institutional management, now 
serves as the primary source of higher education policy (DEST, 2007). 
As statutory bodies, Australian universities are required to meet both State and Federal level 
financial accountability requirements. Universities provide annual reports that are tabled in State 
Parliaments as well as audited financial statements to State ministers (Meek & Hayden, 2005). 
Accountability to the Commonwealth has been met in the past through the production of educational 
profile documents (described in further detail below) and since 2009 through the mission-based 
compacts. In short, as self-governing institutions, universities have a substantial history in accounting 
for their expenditure of public finances (Baird, 2010) 
While at one point, universities were looked upon as “separate, sovereign institutions” (Marginson & 
Considine, 2001, p. 20), the relationship between State and universities has now evolved to one that 
is generally recognised as one steering from a distance (Marginson & Considine, 2001). Up until the 
late 1980s, universities had a high degree of autonomy with substantive control over work practices 
in research and teaching. Ferlie et al. (2008) describe this era as one where “Academics…receive[d] 
a monopoly from the state to exercise their function. The state agree[d] to protect them from the 
external influences, as long as the academic community implement[ed] norms, values and practices 
preventing an abusive use of their knowledge” (p. 327). 
In 1974, the Commonwealth assumed responsibility for universities, and under Labor reforms 
provided students free access to tertiary education. Marginson and Carsidine (2001) argue that while 
these reforms drew the Federal government further into higher education policy, the focus was 
predominantly on financing rather than the outcomes of higher education and “policy development 
was still ranked low” (p. 24). However, the Dawkins era of the mid 1980s marked a major policy 
‘turn’ in Commonwealth-institutional relations.  
During an era of economic uncertainty, the Hawke Government (1983-91) implemented a more 
management centred perspective on the public sector (Marginson & Considine, 2001). John 
Dawkins, the Minister for Education and Training at the time, critiqued the higher education sector 
for its management practices (Marginson & Considine, 2001) arguing that “Rigidities and 
                                                 
5
 Further use of the term “State” should be read as both State and Territory 
6
 A history of higher education funding policy from 1950 through to 2003 is available from: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/hefunding 
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inefficiencies at the institutional level are generated by too few incentives and other barriers to staff 
performance” (Dawkins, 1987, p. 3). He proposed the use of “financial and other advantages” 
(Dawkins, 1987, p. 3) as a carrot to institutions willing to adopt “principles and practices considered 
to be for the general community good” (Dawkins, 1987, p. 3). This would require universities to 
develop institutional profiles, identifying their particular strengths, and these would form the basis of 
funding discussions with the Government.  
Marginson and Considine (2001) argue that Dawkin’s reforms of 1987-1989, marked a seismic shift 
in government-university relations with a government rationality focused on the creation of quasi 
markets and the corporatisation of universities. Dawkin’s position was that universities were 
industries that would be administered under a government department “with a clear economic 
objective” (Marginson & Considine, 2001, p. 30). 
The reforms (Dawkins, 1987, 1988) heralded a unified national system of higher education, merging 
colleges of advanced education, technical and further education institutions focused on vocational 
teaching to either create new universities or to be absorbed within established universities with long 
histories of professional teaching and research traditions. In addition, there was an increase in student 
places with an emphasis on fields thought likely to have an impact on the economy’s recovery and 
growth. Specific policies were targeted at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of management. 
To deliver greater control over higher education resources, Dawkins abolished the Commonwealth 
Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC) that had served as the buffering body between the 
Government and universities (discussed in greater detail below). Finally a more selective approach to 
research funding was established with the creation of the ARC. Harman (1989) argues, that while the 
reforms reflected international trends in higher education at the time, their speed and scope was far 
greater than in other countries. 
Marginson and Considine (2001) propose that the Dawkins reforms established a new model of 
federal governance underpinned by the approach that “Only government policy should direct the 
major allocations within higher education and all else should follow the dictates of good 
management” (p. 35). This they argue was a form of government control via the reorganisation of 
university management. 
Dawkins (1988) viewed university governing councils as too large to be effective and representative 
of too wide a range of institutional interests that had implications for efficient decision making. His 
preference was a reduction in council size, a strengthening of executive leadership and the pursuit of 
a corporate model of governance (Marginson & Considine, 2001). Consequently, Dawkins promoted 
his higher education reforms as an: 
opportunity to adopt appropriate forms of legislation which meet the dual 
objectives of participative decision making and an effective structure for 
accountability…While the Commonwealth has no role in dictating 
management structures to institutions, it has a legitimate interest in 
developing the capacity of institutions to meet their own objectives and to 
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contribute to the achievement of broader national goals for higher education 
(Dawkins, 1988, pp. 102-103). 
Accordingly, the Commonwealth pursued reform in individual university management, through State 
legislation (Marginson & Considine, 2001) in an attempt to develop institutional focus on national 
ambitions.  
In the government issues paper Meeting the challenges: The governance and management of 
universities (DEST, 2002), concerns with university governance was also taken up by the Coalition 
Government. Again there was focus on the pivotal role of university governing bodies and the need 
to ensure the quality of their management capacity. However this was couched in terms related to the 
minimisation of government intervention. Here it was stated that: 
The Commonwealth Government is committed to reducing bureaucratic 
intervention in the management of universities. It recognises that reporting 
can be costly and time consuming. However, the extent to which it can pull 
back in terms of monitoring and reporting requirements will depend upon two 
things: (a) the confidence it has in university governance; and (b) the extent 
to which an agreement can be reached on outcome measures to replace 
unnecessary emphasis on process and inputs (DEST, 2002, p. x). 
Accordingly, the Coalition, keen to free universities to participate in the market for student places, 
was also concerned with the leadership, competence and accountability of university management. 
This eventually led to the development of eleven National Governance Protocols
 
linked to incentive 
funding and financial penalties (DEST, 2003). Of particular significance was the use of the protocols 
to restrict the size and composition of governing bodies. Vidovich and Currie (2011) comment that 
under these protocols: 
There had to be a majority of external independent members, and it was 
specified that they should neither be students nor employees of the provider. 
In effect, this would marginalise the voices of academics and students from 
the ‘heartland’ of universities (p. 47). 
In light of this, Australia entered into a phase of tightly controlled government-institutional relations 
geared towards the corporatisation of university governance and the exclusion of the academic voice. 
Vidovich and Currie (2011) have argued that as the protocol required increased and intense 
interactions between internal and external layers of governance in combination with the threat of 
financial sanctions for non-compliance, the relationship between the Commonwealth and institutions 
was one of deep mistrust on both sides.  
With the 2007 return of the Labor party to Federal government, the protocols and their sanctions 
were quickly removed in an effort to restore trust with the academy (Vidovich & Currie, 2011). With 
this in mind, it is worth considering the history of formal bodies that existed at the nexus between 
institutions and government as indicators of the shifting nature of relations.  
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Coordinating and buffering bodies 
As in other countries Australia has had a varied history of intermediary buffering bodies. Marshall 
(1990) has argued that the evolution of these bodies emerged from a belief that: 
The positioning of an intermediary...between government and institution 
was...essential, not only to safeguard the autonomy of campuses from 
political interference, but also to ensure impartiality in the sensitive arena of 
commonwealth-state relations (p. 148). 
However in 2002, Brendan Nelson as the Minister for Education, Science and Training, commented 
that “Over the years Australia has experimented with ‘buffer’ bodies responsible for making 
decisions on the allocation of student places and funding, or for advising the Government on policy. 
Australia currently does not have such a body”(2002, p. 5). Thus with the new millennium the 
imperative for maintaining some agency to negotiate competing demands across the sector appeared 
to have ended. Meek and Hayden (2005) interpreted Nelson’s apparent disinterest in buffering bodies 
as a mask for a much greater interest in facilitating direct Ministerial control of the higher education 
sector. 
To some extent these bodies have provided an institutional sense of autonomy (King, 2009) during 
particular policy eras. However, as illustrated below, the roles of these bodies have shifted from 
providing policy direction reflecting institutional needs towards one of regulating in favour of 
governmental needs. Given Marshall’s comments, this may be related to the Commonwealth’s 
increasing dominance over State control of higher education. 
 Australian Universities Commission – 1959-1977  
The Australian Universities Commission (AUC) was established in 1959 as an independent body 
to oversee the distribution of capital funding and recurrent grants. It serves as Australia’s first 
organisation designed as a coordinating or buffering agency between institutions and the government 
(Harman, 1984). Modelled on the British Universities Grants Commission, the AUC emerged at a 
time when the Federal government was under increased pressure to accept greater responsibility for 
university planning and financing (Harman, 1984). Harman argues that: 
on balance, [the AUC was] ...a successful mechanism in planning university 
development nationally and in providing detailed advice to government, and 
it enjoyed, in the main, strong support from individual universities, from the 
Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee, and from successive 
Commonwealth and state governments (1984, p. 501). 
As such, the AUC maintained considerable support across both the higher education sector and levels 
of government. The Commission provided detailed triennial reports on universities to the 
Government, reviewing developments, identifying priorities and outlining financial 
recommendations. However, Harman also points out that the AUC was unable to reconcile the 
financial demands of universities with the extent of the Government’s willingness or capacity to 
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spend, and as a result by the end of its tenure there was considerable conflict and tension between the 
agency and the Commonwealth.  
 Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission – 1977-1987 
From 1977 the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC), a statutory authority, 
provided policy advice on university funding requirements and had responsibility for administering 
Commonwealth financial grants (Marshall, 1988). Accordingly, the Commission had substantial 
responsibility for both the formulation and implementation of tertiary education policy (Marshall, 
1990).  
During its first eight years, Marshall comments that “it earned an impressive reputation for the 
stability, coherence and higher standards in policy-making” (1990, p. 147). The formulation of 
higher education policy for government consideration, was conducted through a triennial cycle 
involving negotiations across institutions and both levels of government (Marshall, 1990). Although 
time consuming, this consultative process led to thorough debate, analysis, agreed upon course of 
action resulting in “policy advice of a higher order” (Marshall, 1990, p. 151). However, Marshall 
argues that the neo-liberal and administrative reforms of the mid 1980s, altered the administrative 
context of the Commission in such a way to undermine its performance. There was a surge of interest 
by other government departments in the goings on of higher education with the recognition that 
universities had a role to play in the economic and social future of the country. As a consequence, 
higher education policy was dissipated to a number of different agencies. 
By 1987, the CTEC was quickly abolished by Dawkins 
7, in a move to reaffirm Labor’s intention to 
establish greater Ministerial control over the implementation of university policy (Marshall, 1988; 
Meek & Hayden, 2005). Marshall (1988) argues that its abolition marked a major change in the style 
of higher education policy making at the Commonwealth level as the formulation and 
implementation responsibilities fell directly onto the Australian Department of Education, 
Employment and Training (DEET).  
 National Board of Employment, Education and Training – 1987-1996 
The National Board of Employment, Education and Training (NBEET) was created to advise the 
newly created super ministry (DEET) on the development of tertiary institutions, although it had no 
regulatory or implementation authority. As the Board’s scope extended beyond higher education to 
include employment programs, schools, skills training, research and industry involvement, it 
included four subordinate councils: the Schools Councils, the Higher Education Council (HEC), 
the Employment and Skills Formation Council and the Australian Research Council (ARC) 
(Marshall, 1990). Significantly, while NBEET submitted proposals, responsibility for policy 
production and implementation was with the Minister and his Department.  
A 1994 review of NBEET (Wiltshire, 1994), commissioned by the Labor Government, reported that 
while the organisation had fulfilled most of the expectations held for it, its effectiveness depended 
                                                 
7
 A number of other agencies in other ministries were also abolished at the same time.  
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“on the extent to which Ministers use[d] it to provide the kind of advice for which it was established: 
expert, representative, medium- to long-term, frank and fearless independent advice.” (Wiltshire, 
1994, p. ix). By 1996 the Board had been wound down, although the HEC and ARC were retained. 
 Higher Education Council 1987- 1998 
The Higher Education Council (HEC) took over CTEC’s advisory responsibilities in 1987, while 
CTEC’s coordinating role was transferred to the Department of Employment, Education and 
Training (DEET) (Meek & Hayden, 2005). With the abolition of NBEET in 1996, HEC was re-
established as a statutory body. Senator Vanstone as the Minister for Education, Training and Youth 
Affairs announced the creation of the HEC and the Australian Research Council (ARC) in her budget 
statement in 1996, indicating that the agencies formed part of a more strategic relationship between 
the Commonwealth and tertiary institutions directed at creating a “less interventionist role in relation 
to its advisory structures, industrial relations issues, and accountability requirements” (Vanstone, 
1996, p. viii). However, by 1998 the Council was disbanded by the new Minister, David Kemp.  
 Australian Research Council – 2001 (Mark 2)- present 
Although the Australian Research Council (ARC) had formally existed under the NBEET until 1996, 
legislation to abolish the Board did not occur until 2000. Consequently, from 1996 to 2001, the ARC 
provided advice on research programs that were administered through DEET and later DEETYA
8
 
(Larkins, 2011). By 1999, it was announced that the ARC would have its own Act of Parliament in 
an effort to strengthen its role, independence, accountability and transparency (Larkins, 2011). 
Accordingly the council was formally re-established in 2001 as an independent statutory authority to 
coordinate research and researching training funding. The council’s decision making takes place 
within the Government’s policy focus on national research priorities and the enhancement of 
competition across institutions for research funding (Goedegebuure, Hayden, & Meek, 2009).  
 Larkins comments that the ARC’s : 
strength has been the close involvement of the research community in the 
peer review decision-making grant processes. Over the years remarkably few 
criticisms have been made concerning the operational side of the ARC 
processes (2011, p. 149). 
In this regard, as a coordinating body, it has relied heavily on the engagement of the academic 
community within its own processes.  
However, in 2005 Minister Nelson announced his intention to abolish the ARC’s governing board in 
response to a report on the corporate governance of statutory authorities 
9
. This was argued to be a 
move directed at improving transparency and accountability. Consequently, the ARC was placed 
under an executive management system of governance, in other words a CEO who reported directly 
to the Minister. The elimination of the board created considerable concern that the buffering effect of 
                                                 
8
 The Department of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs. 
9
 The Uhrig report 
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the ARC would be undermined with loss of an “additional safeguard between the Minister and the 
peer review process” (Allport, 2006, p. 5). 
In 2008, in response to Brendan Nelson’s (as the Coalition Minister for Education) interference in the 
selection of research grant allocations (Lane, July 18, 2007; Rood, November 16, 2005), the 
incoming Labor Government announced the establishment of an independent Advisory Council to 
provide the ARC with “non-binding strategic and policy advice” (Carr, 2008b). 
 Australian Universities Quality Agency – 2001-2011 
The establishment of the Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) in 2001 provided a 
regulatory agency for both institutions as well as State authorities. AUQA had responsibilities for 
auditing universities as well as those authorities overseeing the National Protocols, registration and 
accreditation of universities (Baird, 2010). The five-yearly audits resulted in reports on institutional 
performance and provided recommendations for improvements.  
However the increased focus on quality, standards, efficiency and effectiveness is thought to have 
had an impact on AUQA’s original objectives (Baird, 2010; Woodhouse, 2010). While initially 
established as a flexible quality assurance structure to enable individual, institutional improvement, 
the organisation’s work eventually evolved into one of threshold checking against external 
requirements for accreditation purposes (Woodhouse, 2010).  
AUQA has been described as being moderately successful in establishing itself with universities, as a 
trustworthy agency (Baird, 2010). In this regard, the reports were seen as credible by both institution 
and governments alike. As a consequence Reid suggested that the “AUQA process [was] clearly used 
by university managers to assist them in engaging in the marketplace to demonstrate competitive 
advantage. It is perhaps impossible for a national audit body to avoid being used as a tool in the 
global marketplace” (2009, p. 590). This might suggest a somewhat canny relationship between 
AUQA and institutions, perhaps facilitated by the relative lack of authority held by the agency.  
The Bradley review argued that AUQA’s organisation was inadequate as an accreditation agency due 
to its lack of power if universities failed to meet performance criteria. One of the review’s key 
recommendations was the replacement of AUQA with a new “independent ‘buffer body’ to carry out 
[the] functions” (Bradley, Noonan, Nugent, & Scales, 2008, p. 215) of reporting and accreditation 
against nationally consistent standards.  
 Tertiary Education Quality Standards Authority – 2011- present 
The disestablishment of AUQA and the creation of the Tertiary Education Quality Standards 
Authority (TEQSA) marked a subtle shift in governance responsibility. While AUQA served as a 
representative agency of all States, TEQSA is owned by the Federal government implying a 
considerable transference of power (Baird, 2010).  
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Gallagher (2011) has argued that the initial drafting of the TEQSA legislation was problematic and 
punitive, requiring fast renegotiation with the higher education sector to include an appeals 
mechanism. He commented that: 
It is regrettable that institutional safeguards have had to be pursued via 
legalistic channels rather than through policy dialogue. But the Government 
had locked itself in long before its proposals became apparent, and the new 
Minister has had little room for policy shifts in a Government that is sensitive 
about its ‘reform’ implementation track record. (p. 5) 
This suggests that the collaborative and consultative relationship once evident between institutes and 
the state (and made possible via bodies such as CTEC), has clearly been replaced by a top-down and 
reactive policy design strategy. As such, TEQSA marks a move towards more centralised regulation 
of Australian universities.  
At the time of its establishment, Senator Evans (March 01, 2011), as the Minister for Tertiary 
Education, stated that TEQSA would take over regulatory and quality assurance responsibilities to 
“reduce the number or federal, state and territory agencies from nine to one” (¶ 16). Significantly, he 
implied that TEQSA would enable a ‘hands-off’ approach to governance for some higher education 
providers with the comment that “TEQSA will enshrine a risk-based approach which will take into 
account the scale, mission and history of each provider and allow higher quality, lower risk providers 
to operate without unnecessary intrusion” (¶18) . Thus the implication was that quality universities, 
presumably identified through audits and ERA rankings, would retain their autonomy, while 
underperforming institutions would be subject to closer monitoring. To this effect, he went on to 
comment: 
Some have argued that the creation of a national regulator will open the door 
to political intrusion into university affairs. My view is that precisely the 
opposite will happen. Operating at arm’s length from the Government of the 
day, TEQSA will act as a bulwark against inappropriate political 
interference...Australia has a proud tradition of universities which are fiercely 
independent. That is a tradition which I intend to defend. (¶19-33) 
In response and in opposition to Minister Carr’s position, Gallagher (2011) argued that the TEQSA 
legislation serves to empower ministers, not an independent body, to set teaching and learning and 
research standards with a minimal level of constraint.  
The transformation of Australian public universities  
Australian public universities have subsequently undergone substantial transformation over a single 
generation. Gallagher has described this as occurring in two phases; “the first pulling away from 
traditional academic orientations and the second pushing towards stronger market influences” 
(Gallagher, September 2000, p. 1) and as a consequence, developing themselves as entrepreneurial 
public universities. Gallagher argued that the shift to a market orientation initiated a change in the 
relationship between universities and the state. This is characterised as a move from: 
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directive to facilitative policies and mechanisms but with a stronger emphasis 
on accountability for outcomes. There is simultaneously a loosening and a 
tightening of regulatory measures; a loosening of input and process controls 
to enable the universities to be more enterprising and a tightening of demands 
relating to educational standards and cost-effective use of resources as they 
become so. (p. 49)  
Marginson and Considine (2001) describes this transformation of the academic institution as the 
Enterprise University to characterise the complex interplay between economic and academic 
dimensions “in which research and scholarship survive but are now subjected to new systems of 
competition and demonstrable performance. ‘Enterprise’ is as much about generating institutional 
prestige as about income” (Marginson & Considine, 2001, p. 5).  
According to Marginson (2001), the consequences of the enterprise university, underpinned by 
strong executive control, business and consumption models of decision making, is that: 
The bottom line is not teaching, research knowledge, the perpetuation of 
academic values or the public good created by higher education. In the 
Enterprise University, the bottom line is the interests of the university – its 
prestige, its income, its competitiveness – as an end in itself. (p. 63) 
Marginson argues that while this self-interest sets the ideal conditions for governments to steer from 
a distance and thereby downplay a government’s responsibility, it also “locks in...the decline in unit 
quality, the underproduction of public good, the weakening of global capacity” (2001, p. 61). In this 
respect the enterprise university has benefits in relation to engaging institutions with their wider 
community roles, greater efficiencies in their management practices, and the improvement of 
transparency and accountabilities However, this has come at some cost as a consequence of a 
reduction in resources, lopsided patterns of incentives, the attraction of research funding and its focus 
on applied and commercial markets as well as increased demands on academic workloads 
(Marginson, 2001). 
The transformation of Australian public universities as competitive, business entities that are 
strategically controlled inevitably brings a focus on accountability to external stakeholders. Reid has 
argued that “it is within the managerialist context that notions of quality assurance have developed” 
(2009, p. 575). Similarly, Vidovich (2001) stresses that the ideological shift towards the redefinition 
of education as “a servant of the economy – national economies and the (reified) global economy” 
(p. 249). In this respect, the commodification of education, in combination with its role in 
productivity, has positioned quality initiatives as a tool for raising the accountability of universities.  
Part 2 – Justification and rationale: quality assurance in Australian universities  
Following Labor’s election to government in 2007, Julia Gillard as the Minister for Education and 
Minister for Social Inclusion, commissioned a broad ranging review of higher education (Bradley, et 
al., 2008). This was justified by concerns over a loss of Australia’s global competitiveness, attributed 
to the Coalition’s neglect of the higher education sector and the under-funding of human capital. 
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Gillard argued that ameliorating problems of participation and completions, and the re-invigoration 
of Australia’s research capacity, would require systemic change and a new policy direction. The 
review was to provide evidence to inform the Government’s policy direction. In addition, Gillard 
(2008) argued that the review would: 
build on the collaborative new approach to Government-University 
relationships embodied in our proposed mission-based compacts...We want to 
encourage universities to pursue distinctive missions within a public 
reporting framework of mission-based goals agreed outcomes and 
performance standards...For the first time in many years, Australian 
universities will have a Federal government that trusts and respects them. (p. 
6) 
Thus, the Labor Government’s higher education reforms were directed at new state-institutional 
arrangements, where internal governance would drive reform and improvement. This consultative 
and cooperative approach appeared to recognise the importance of university identity and 
differentiation as an important driver of the change process.  
The Bradley review provided 46 recommendations primarily targeted at improving investment, 
funding to, and regulation of higher education. The report was underpinned by the argument that “the 
reach, quality and performance of a nation’s higher education system would be key determinants of 
its economic and social progress” (Bradley, et al., 2008, p. xi). 
In addition, the report considered the nexus between teaching and research, determining that this link 
should be strengthened in light of international opinion. This was despite an acknowledgement that 
“it is difficult to find compelling research evidence which unequivocally supports the argument that 
graduates with degrees from such institutions are demonstrably better than those from teaching-only 
institutions” (Bradley, et al., 2008, p. 124).  
The Government’s response to the report, was set out in Transforming Australia’s Higher Education 
System (DEEWR, 2009) detailing a shift towards a demand-driven, student centred funding model, 
the establishment of a higher education regulatory and quality agency, and an injection of funding to 
cover the indirect costs of research. The latter initiative was targeted at minimising the cross 
subsidisation of research from teaching and learning funds. The Government identified new funding 
incentive programs and a performance measurement system. These included the SRE, funding for 
building collaborative research and the ERA. 
While the reforms proposed were directed at establishing student centred higher education, this 
would also require a renewed focus on quality in both teaching and research. Thus the dominant 
discourse underpinning the Rudd/Gillard higher education reforms is one of quality assurance. As in 
other countries, concerns with the quality of universities have had a substantial history and the 
Australian policy context has mirrored international trends. The policy history not only reflects the 
shifting relations between the Commonwealth and Australia’s universities, but also provides insight 
into the changing nature of institutional governance and the emergence of performance management 
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systems for the higher education sector. In addition, given the somewhat slippery concept of quality 
(Harvey & Green, 1993; Vidovich, 2001), the difficulty of its measurement, and its increasing 
connection to funding and public accountability, the context is set for unique institutional responses. 
Historical background 
The focus on quality has at times played out differently in relation to university reputation, research 
productivity and student experiences (Brooks, 2005). These alternative and co-occurring points of 
focus reflect the complex nature of academic work not neatly categorised into a single unit of 
analysis able to provide a reliable measure of quality. Indeed, Harvey and Green argue that it may be 
more useful to understand quality as a “philosophical concept” (1993, p. 28) and as such stress the 
importance of identifying the criteria used by stakeholders to judge quality “when assessments of 
quality are undertaken” (Harvey & Green, 1993, p. 28). In light of this the following discussion maps 
out the evolution of Australian policy on university quality to highlight historical changes and broad 
points of emphasis. 
 1970s-1980s 
From the 1970s through to the early 1990s Australian universities were encouraged to critically self-
monitor their performance (DETYA, 2000) through CTEC. The Evaluations and Investigations 
Programme provided grants for studies focused on such areas as resource usage, course evaluations 
and organisational units within tertiary institutions (Mikol, 1996). In this respect, the management of 
quality remained within the institutional control of universities, suggesting considerable trust in their 
self-regulation. 
In the 1980s an additional focus on “efficiency, effectiveness, and an increased awareness of public 
accountability” (DETYA, 2000, p. 2) had emerged, accompanying a global trend positioning higher 
education as a cost to the economy requiring tougher political action (Marginson & Considine, 
2001). By 1986, CTEC in their Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness of Higher Education, 
commented that “overall institutions had not developed standard procedures for systematic self-
evaluation” (Mikol, 1996, p. 5). This was subsequently followed by discipline reviews in 
engineering, teacher education in maths and science, accounting, agriculture, computing and 
information sciences education. The intention of these reviews was to “rationalize institutional 
activities and encourages closer linkages between curricula content and industrial requirements” 
(Marshall, 1990, p. 157). However, as argued my Mikol (1996), the reviews were only undertaken in 
a small number of disciplines as a response, in part, to the reactions from universities and “the 
unprecedented public comparisons of institutions” (p. 5). 
The Dawkins reforms of the late 1980s saw an increased focus on university accountability. The 
White Paper, Higher Education: a policy statement (Dawkins, 1988), mentioned the “quality 
objective” (p. 9) of Labor’s reform agenda as one that would be serviced through the linking of 
funding to the development of the educational profiles. Here the allocation of funds was “based on 
agreed priorities for institutional activity and performance against those priorities, rather than any 
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arbitrary system of institutional classification” (Dawkins, 1987, p. 28). Educational profiles would 
define the institutional roles of both the newly formed and older universities and became the main 
mechanism through which the Government held the higher education sector to account (Vidovich, 
2001).  
Vidovich (2001) argues that “although quality is not defined, it appeared to read as ‘excellent 
standards’” (p. 252). In effect, quality defined as excellence took on “a new utilitarian and economic 
guise, marked by an emphasis on ‘competitiveness’ and ‘centres of excellence’” (Tijssen, 2003, p. 
91). More specifically, the model of excellence being applied in 1988 was one of superior quality 
(Tijssen, 2003), only possible under limited circumstances when institutions excelled in inputs and 
outputs (Harvey & Green, 1993).  
The Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs argued that the reorganisation of 
institutions and the accompanying growth in higher education in the 1980s were key drivers of 
university QA efforts (Vidovich, 2001). Vidovich proposed that quality assurance policies were, in 
effect, useful mechanisms to “enhance the accountability of universities through ‘steering at a 
distance’, where central authorities increase control over desired outcomes/ends but deregulate 
processes/means” (2002, p. 392). In addition, Vidovich characterises this policy phase as moving 
accountability and quality “to centre stage by 1991” (2001, p. 252). Thus the scene was set for 
emergence of a new policy context. 
Until the new millennium, Australian QA policy has been described as evolving over three distinct 
phases marking particular focus or declining interest in academic quality (Vidovich, 2001, 2002); 
The first of these eras occurring between 1991 and 1995, the second extending to the late 1990s and 
the third developing from 2000. However, Harman’s (2011) work suggests a fourth era from 2003 
linked to the influence of global institutional ranking .  
 1991-1995 
Following the 1988 White paper, Peter Baldwin (1991) as Minister for Higher Education and 
Employment Services in the Hawke/Keating Government, released the policy statement Higher 
Education: Quality and diversity in the 1990s. The paper in part, was targeted specifically at QA 
arrangements and their link to performance funding. He announced that an annual amount of $70m, 
additional to normal institutional funding, would be available “to reward institutions that make the 
best use of their total resources” (Baldwin, 1991, p. 4). In addition the policy statement indicated an 
awareness of the problems and limitations of quantitative performance indicators. In this respect the 
Government confined the use of these measures to the institutions themselves. Further, Baldwin 
stated that: 
The Government has no intention of prescribing performance indicators to be 
used by institutions, nor will normal operating grants be redistributed on the 
basis of comparative quantitative indicators. Measures of performance 
developed for application at the institutional level will be orientated to the 
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specific mission of each institution, thereby avoiding pressures for 
uniformity. (1991, p. 4) 
However, while the policy statement was unable to provide a definition of quality, Vidovich (2001) 
argues that at this stage, the policy discourse reiterated the excellent standards model promoted by 
Dawkins. Accordingly, the Government’s focus was on the reform of the internal management of 
universities (Vidovich, 2002).  
Baldwin (1991) also announced the Government’s intention for the HEC to further explore the 
characteristics of quality in higher education with the intention of establishing a national quality 
assurance structure. By 1992 the Commonwealth had established the Committee for Quality 
Assurance in Higher Education (CQAHE) to: 
Provide advice on quality assurance issues, conduct independent audits of 
institutional quality assurance policies and procedures, and to make 
recommendations to the Government on the allocation of annual quality-
related funds. (DETYA, 2000, p. 2) 
Vidovich argues that the HEC set the agenda for the quality debate, establishing “an input-process-
outcome (production type) model of quality, with a primary focus on outcomes” (2001, p. 253). 
Whilst also acknowledging the problem of identifying a meaningful definition of quality, the HEC 
stated that: 
Understanding what the universities seek to do is the first step in 
understanding its value; knowing how they manage their processes to yield 
quality outcomes, evaluate their achievements, their performance and what 
they do with the results, is an important step in deciding whether or not a 
university achieves its aims – deciding whether or not its achievements are 
valuable. (1992, p. 6) 
Thus the emphasis on quality moved towards attention to the institution’s process and the expected 
outcomes (Vidovich, 2001). Harvey and Green (1993) and Marginson (1997) refer to this particular 
conceptualisation of quality as one judged according to the processes that are employed to achieve 
particular outcomes. Here there is no absolute threshold that must be exceeded to evaluate quality 
activity. More specifically, this understanding constructs quality as fitness for purpose particularly in 
its relationship to fulfilling the mission of the institution, that is subsequently guided by a quality 
assurance process (Harvey & Green, 1993). Quality assurance, according to Harvey and Green, “is 
about ensuring that there are mechanisms, procedures and processes in place to ensure that the 
desired quality, however defined and measured, is delivered…The assumption implicit in the 
development of quality assurance is that if mechanisms exist, quality can be assured” (1993, pp. 19-
20). 
Between the years 1993 to 1995, the CQHE undertook three rounds of voluntary, whole institution 
audits. Harman argues that Australia implemented a QA approach, through these audits “that differed 
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substantially from those set in place at the same time by other OECD countries” (Harman, 2001, p. 
168). These audits included the: 
 ranking of institutions into bands, based on annual assessments and 
publications of these rankings; 
 publication of detailed individual institutional annual reports; and 
 performance funding, with funding coming from a special additional 
government allocation. (Harman, 2001, p. 168) 
In addition, the audits extended the focus on quality assurance processes outlined by HEC (Higher 
Education Council, 1992), to include quality outcomes (Harman, 2001; Vidovich, 2001), requiring 
“much more emphasis to be placed on national statistical data collected by DEET and thus providing 
advantages to major well established universities which tended to score well on most indicators” 
(Harman, 2001, p. 180). As well, Harman (2001) argues that the Minister responsible for initially 
implementing the audits, was Kim Beazley, a former academic who was persuaded that international 
competitiveness would be enabled through the establishment of a small number of world-class 
universities. Accordingly, the audits and their associated funding would facilitate this.  
The audits in combination with the ranking and allocation of funding, had a profound influence on 
Australian higher education. Marginson (1997) stated that: 
Nothing less than the positional status of every institution were at stake; the 
process of competitive ranking had a compelling effect, leading to the rapid 
spread of a reflective culture of continuous improvement. (p. 74) 
In addition, Baird (2010) commented that the credibility of the process employed in the audits varied 
and that it was unlikely that “improved trust relations between universities and the Federal 
Government” (p. 34) would result. Indeed, Vidovich argues that the differentiation of higher 
education through institutional ranking was more keenly felt within the sector although the 
Committee for Quality Assurance “was reluctant to acknowledge it” (Vidovich, 2002, p. 397). More 
specifically, the audits were argued to threaten institutional autonomy by effectively exerting 
downward pressure for all institutions to emulate the models set out by the traditional, high 
performing universities. Vidovich proposes that quality assurance policies during this period: 
can be seen as a mechanism for ‘steering at a distance’, and in particular as a 
top-down managerial devise for reforming the structure and functioning of 
both the higher education sector and individual universities, along the lines 
envisaged by the policy elites. (2002, p. 397) 
At the end of this review process, the HEC (1995) produced another report in response to expected 
reduction in discretionary funding to universities. It recommended continuation of the national QA 
processes, emphasising the importance: of “outcomes; on quantitative assessments; on external 
scrutiny; on rhetoric of QI; and on the ‘mainstreaming’ of quality with the general accountability 
requirements of the annual institutional profiles” (Vidovich, 2001, p. 254). However, before these 
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recommendations could be implemented, there was a change of government with the election of the 
Coalition in 1996, heralding a three year ‘quality vacuum’ (Vidovich, 2001) in higher education 
policy. 
 1996-1999 
The Howard Government abolished the CQAHE in 1996 and responsibility for quality assurance 
systems was subsequently given to the HEC (Marginson, 1997). Amanda Vanstone as the new 
Minister for Education, Training and Youth Affairs, announced that the Government would be 
applying “A new approach to quality...[integrating] quality improvement processes with institutions’ 
own particular missions and strategic planning” (Vanstone, 1996, p. vii). She also argued that the 
Commonwealth government would employ a “more strategic, less interventionist role in relation to 
its advisory structures...and accountability requirements” (1996viii). This new approach reiterated the 
conceptualisation of quality as excellence in standards (Vidovich, 2001) with Vanstone’s dismissal 
of the Labor’s approach that “all institutions could be ranked against a common set of criteria” 
(1996, p. 13). 
However, Vidovitch (2002) argues that by 1998, the QA efforts of the higher education sector lost 
momentum. The HEC was disbanded and quality appeared to have been absorbed into quantitative 
performance indicators (Vidovich, 2002). By 1999 the DETYA (1999) had established annual 
reporting on the quality of Australian universities as a process of QA that would entail “the 
development of a national framework which safeguards the integrity of the system and [allows] 
Australia to market a quality product internationally” ( ¶ 7). While DETYA’s report asserted the 
importance and significance of individual institutional plans, there was particular focus on common 
ground across institutions in their processes for monitoring and value in consolidating the data 
provided by universities. DETYA’s report published the QA processes and quality indicators being 
applied in all universities, as evidence of the efforts being employed across the sector, although 
Vidovich (2002) argues that this could also have been perceived as demonstrating a lack of rigour 
and coordination on behalf of the Government.  
Vidovich (2001) has characterised this phase in policy as one where: 
quality discourses were taking a harder-nosed edge, and in particular quality 
was being conflated with quantitative PIs [performance indicators]. There 
was evidence of some respect for university autonomy in terms of negotiating 
quality assessments, but there was closer steerage by government, such that 
universities were subject to more direct one-to-one control by the policy elite. 
(p. 256) 
 Early 2000s  
In 1999, David Kemp (December 10, 1999), as Minister for Education, Training and Youth Affairs, 
announced a new era in QA efforts for the higher education sector. The cornerstone of the 
Government’s approach was to be the AUQA which sought to give international credibility to the 
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higher education sector. The new agency was established to undertake audits of institutions and to 
monitor and report on the quality assurance efforts of universities and significantly, monitor and 
report on the “comparative world standing of the Australian higher education system and the quality 
assurance framework itself, drawing on data derived from the audit processes” (Kemp, December 10, 
1999 ¶40). 
Kemp stated that AUQA’s:  
main role will be to verify the claims made by institutions. Its audits and 
reports will be the evidence used to assure students, the community and the 
outside world that our universities are as good as we know them to be. The 
key to the model is credibility and that can only be guaranteed if it is quite 
clear that the agency is not beholden to any particular interest group and 
cannot be compromised in its role. It is critical to ensure that the quality 
assurance framework is, and is seen to be, rigorous and independent....The 
agency should be at arm’s length from government. The agency experts must 
be allowed to undertake their audits without fear or favour and the agency 
reports will be made public. (¶31-32).  
While this replicated the discourse on QA as a process seen in prior years, Vidovich (2002) argued 
this marked the point when both the Government and universities recognised the potential of QA as a 
marketing tool requiring “a highly visible external validation component” (p. 398). 
Kemp’s approach with AUQA as an intermediary body (similar to the position held by the prior 
CQAHE) was to establish the credibility of the new body through the appointment of expert panels, 
thereby broadening participation in assessment exercises (Vidovich, 2002). Importantly, the focus for 
AUQA’s audits was on universities’ QA process, rather than on the quality of teaching or the quality 
of research (Meek & Hayden, 2005). 
In relation to funding, if AUQA published an adverse report on individual institutions, universities 
were at risk of losing Commonwealth financial support (Kemp, 1999). Vidovich (2001) describes 
this as evidence that the Government was applying a harder-nosed approach to the QA process, 
commenting that: 
Even the language of quality assessments [had] changed from ‘reviews’ (the 
term deliberately used by CQAHE to create a softer sense of respect for the 
traditional modus operandi of universities) to ‘audits’, signalling new power 
relations in the sector. (p. 257) 
In addition, Vidovich (2001) argued that despite the ongoing emphasis on institutional process, this 
was also combined with a stronger push for outcomes and a particular focus on quantification to 
support the rigour objective.  
Similarly, Reid’s (2009) analysis of AUQA highlights two themes. The first, that as an independent 
institutional auditing body, it prescribed and proscribed university actions at a distance. More 
specifically, he argues that as a watchdog “AUQA was established not to comment directly on 
ERA 
   
28 | P a g e  
 
quality or to impact government policy, but instead to play an independent role in carrying out audits 
and to produce public reports” (Reid, 2009, p. 578). Second, that the policy shift meant the 
establishment of a government constructed model of an ideal university, where “quality assurance 
measures within a university could then be seen as a proxy for its claims of legitimacy as an 
institution” (Reid, 2009, p. 577). 
 2003 and beyond 
Whilst quality assurance processes for universities generally covered a number of areas, the 
substantial increase in student numbers that had occurred during the 1990s drove a particular focus 
on the quality of programs and the teaching and learning role of universities. Accordingly the issue 
of research quality has typically received less attention in governments’ QA policies. Harman (2011) 
argues that although Australia has used simple indicators to assess research quality since the 1990s, 
the impact of global competition and university rankings has shifted government thinking on both 
quality assurance and research. Here he states that: 
with the growing importance of research activities and outputs in both 
national innovation systems and various systems of university ranking, much 
more attention is now being given to research quality, whether or not such 
assessments are viewed as part of national quality assurance systems. (p. 43)  
Harman goes further to argue that the input, output metrics that had been used to link research quality 
processes to performance based funding, lacked “rigorous assessment of research quality and an 
inability to generate robust data to meet accountability and international benchmarking needs” 
(Harman, 2009, p. 153). Consequently, since 2003 the pursuit of an alternative QA model for 
research has driven the efforts of both the Howard and Rudd/Gillard governments.  
This new policy current (Harman, 2011) began in 2001 when the Howard Government presented a 
five-year strategy directed at improving Australia’s innovative capacity of industry, research sector 
and education system (Commonwealth of Australia, 2001). The strategy involved an injection of $2.9 
billion for initiatives designed to promote research and stimulate innovation. The objectives of the 
initiative were to facilitate excellence in research, reflecting the discourse on quality evident in the 
late 1980s particularly on its attention to developing Centres of Excellence.  
Backing Australia’s ability (Commonwealth of Australia, 2001), was closely aligned to Kemp’s 1999 
policy statement on research and research training, Knowledge and innovation that had expressed the 
Government’s concern with Australia’s capacity to meet the “global revolution in knowledge 
production” (Kemp, 1999, p. iii). Accordingly, Kemp announced changes to research financing that 
would include an invigoration of the competitive grant system as well as a performance based 
funding system to allow all universities to compete effectively. By 2004 a review of the 1999 policy 
reforms stated that while the: 
key principles of Knowledge and Innovation are widely supported…a number 
of stakeholders consider that there is a need to strengthen drivers for 
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excellence (through research quality)….There was substantial comment on 
the need to assess universities on the quality of their research outputs and the 
desirability of using such assessments as a tool for allocation. There was 
discussion about whether Australia should adopt some variant of the United 
Kingdom’s Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)10. (DEST, 2004, pp. xi-
xiii) 
This would suggest that the competitive nature of the grant system pushed ground level support for 
an increased focus on research quality. Universities had become dissatisfied with the simple metrics 
used at the time to direct research funding. Harman states that “Influential sections of the science 
community also urged for more rigorous assessment in the hope that a new quality assessment 
mechanism could lead to substantial increases in block research funding” (2009, p. 166). 
Donovan (2008) argues that the resultant initiative, the Research Quality Framework (RQF) was 
an attempt by the Government to address the concerns of the academic community for quality 
research with their own objectives of funding research that would have a greater impact value for the 
nation. In other words, accommodation of an excellent standards discourse of university research, 
within a form of excellence where the quality of a university is determined by the consistency of its 
research output (Harvey & Green, 1993). In addition, these definitions were juxtaposed by the 
Government’s discourse on quality and its value for money, efficiency and effectiveness with its 
associated preference for audit, accountability and improvement through competition. Accordingly 
these alternative, yet co-occurring conceptualisations of quality are reflective of multiple 
stakeholders (Harvey & Green, 1993) driving the initiative.  
Harman argues that the development of the RQF process was closely entwined with the emergence 
of global university ranking systems. He argues that: 
Global rankings have become new forms of “super” quality assessment that 
have considerable attraction, with their use of simple numerical scores or 
leagues tables. They have confirmed the notion of a world university market 
in which higher education institutions are measured according to their relative 
standing on a global scale. (Harman, 2009, p. 51)  
Significantly, international ranking provides a comparison of university research capacity at the 
neglect of teaching quality. Here the international standing of a university identified through world 
ranking exercises “feeds into… [institutions’] capacity to produce globally salient outputs and their 
generic attractiveness to other HEIs [higher education institutions], to prospective students, and to 
economic capital” (Marginson & van der Wend, 2007, p. 313).  
In this respect, despite the use of performance indicators and benchmarking, the assumptions 
underlying public interpretation of international ranking is one employing a traditional interpretation 
of quality, where status and privilege is assigned to an institution regardless of its performance. More 
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 The RAE commenced in 1986. 
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specifically, there is an assumption that the quantity and quality of an institution’s research is closely 
connected to the quality of its teaching and learning (Marginson & van der Wend, 2007).  
In March 2005 the Government announced that it was establishing a 12 member Expert Advisory 
Group (EAG), chaired by Sir Gareth Roberts
11
, given responsibility for developing the RQF 
(Nelson, March 29, 2005). Minister Nelson (March 29, 2005) commented that the RQF would: 
measure both research excellence and research impact. The framework will 
provide a more consistent and comprehensive approach to assessing publicly 
funded research and will provide a sound foundation for future research 
resource allocation. (¶5) 
Here research quality “[described] the measurable influence of academic research on the academic 
community. [and] Research impact denotes the benefits or returns from research, which flow beyond 
the academic realm to ‘end users’ of research” (Donovan, 2008, p. 48).  
By September of that year, the EAG (2005) had identified a preferred model for the RQF. The 
process would be panel-based along broad disciplinary lines that would assess both excellence and 
the wider benefits to Australia (Donovan, 2008). Assessment would be undertaken at the research-
group level, utilising evidence portfolios and there would be a graded impact rating scale that would 
lead to the allocation of block grants (Donovan, 2008). A key objective for the EAG was to provide 
quality assurance for international benchmarking.  
The RQF was due to be implemented in 2009 which meant an extensive timeframe for consultation 
and development. Harman argues that universities were wary of the possible impacts of this national 
assessment exercise commenting that: 
lack of any decisions on how research block funds would be distributed; 
complexity and cost; the heavy administrative load that would be placed on 
university academics and administrators; and the capacity of the 13 
Disciplinary Panels to make reliable peer judgements. An important unknown 
was what consequence the RQF might have on the overall direction of 
university research, particularly research where impact cannot readily be 
assessed. (Harman, 2009, p. 169) 
With the defeat of the Coalition in the 2007 general election, Labor moved swiftly to abandon the 
RQF. Senator Carr (Dec 21, 2007) as Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research stated 
that:  
The RQF is poorly designed, administratively expensive and relies on an 
‘impact’ measure that is unverifiable and ill-defined...I want to implement a 
less cumbersome and less costly process that still provides the Australian 
Government and taxpayers with an efficient and transparent process. A 
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 Sir Gareth had recently completed a review of the United Kingdom’s Research Assessment Exercise. 
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process that ensures valuable research dollars are allocated to the university 
sector using internationally verifiable measures (¶4, ¶ 9). 
Larkins (2011) argues that despite the inadequacies of the RQF initiative and its failure to be 
realised, it nevertheless had a significant effect in universities. He states that: 
it did provide a stimulus for institutions to evaluate their fields of research 
excellence, reassess research strengths and priorities relative to national and 
international benchmarks and to evaluate the impact of outputs beyond peer-
reviewed publication and citation. In some institutions research performance 
was sharply focused on the individual, perhaps for the first time, as 
acceptable definitions of research-active staff were developed and staff 
performance profiles more closely scrutinised. (p. 95)  
In this regard preparations for the RQF triggered organisational responses directed at the 
performance of individuals and their research potential to strengthen or weaken university standing.  
Carr’s subsequent announcement of ERA as the replacement to RQF described the new initiative as 
“streamlined, internationally-recognised, research quality assurance processes using metrics or other 
agreed upon quality measures appropriate to each research discipline” (¶ 5). Accordingly, the new 
quality assurance process reconfirmed the concept of quality as a definition of value for money 
(Harvey & Green, 1993), where performance indicators would serve as measures of institutional 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
The following year, the Bradley Review of Higher Education (2008) reported that structural reforms 
in Australia’s regulatory framework for universities was needed if the country was to compete 
internationally. The report stated that: 
Submissions from across the higher education sector supported the 
streamlining of current reporting requirements and accreditation processes, 
with nationally consistent standards and quality assurance applying to all 
higher education providers. There was considerable support for an 
independent ‘buffer body’ to carry out these functions...The Australian 
Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) audit process was generally believed to 
be valuable and useful to higher education providers in improving their 
quality assurance processes. However, there was support for greater focus on 
outcomes measures within Australia’s quality assurance regime. (p. 215) 
Here the quality discourse, employing performance indicators, was to be linked to a watchdog body 
to give consumers (students, governments) some “resource if they are not getting a good deal” 
(Harvey & Green, 1993, p. 23).  
Accordingly, with the establishment of TEQSA, the focus on standards as a measure of performance 
will serve as a measure of higher education quality. This marks a substantial cultural shift in the 
auditing of Australian higher education institutions. David Woodhouse, as the Executive Director of 
AUQA commented that “in ten years, we have moved from a light-touch system...to a Total Quality 
Management System” (Woodhouse, 2010, p. 5). 
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Final reflections 
The governance of Australia’s higher education sector, while unique to our domestic conditions, 
reflects global trends away from a traditional model of largely independent, autonomous, self-
governing institutions, to one that is less easily defined, more complex to navigate, and from a policy 
perspective more difficult to balance. This summary sketches a policy context directed at the steering 
of Australian universities towards an international standing in research. Ferlie et al. (2008) argue that 
the steering patterns employed by governments can be connected to three core and co-occurring 
narratives: the New Public Management, the Network Governance and the Neo-Weberian narratives. 
The authors argue that such a conceptualisation provides an opportunity for research to move beyond 
the realm of state-university relationships to consider the state and the academic profession (Ferlie, et 
al., 2008) and therefore the triad of state-institution-academic relations.  
In light of this particular conceptualisation of the higher education sector, it is possible to locate ERA 
within the New Public Management narrative as an evaluation process and therefore an “[instrument] 
of steering” (Ferlie, et al., 2008, p. 341). ERA is closely associated with funding incentives and the 
existence of established and newly created intermediary bodies that also link it to Network 
Governance and Neo-Weberian narratives. For example ERA data is linked to the building of 
institutional research capacity through the Collaborative Research Network Program, and 
accountability is softened through the mission-based compacts, considered by Ferlie et al. (2008) to 
be indicators of Network Governance in action. Finally, the Neo-Weberian narrative (Ferlie, et al., 
2008) is evident both in the Commonwealth’s positioning of ERA as a strategic solution to the 
challenges of the knowledge economy and as a quality assurance process for the Australian public.  
Accordingly, ERA as a performance management system, sits amidst a complex raft of reform 
narratives that “each tell a policy and management story” (Ferlie, et al., 2008, p. 334). However, the 
stability of these reforms is in no way secure or guaranteed and may produce perverse effects. ERA 
does not exist in isolation and will at some point collide awkwardly with other instruments of 
steering
12
. Recent commentary from the Chief Scientist, Ian Chubb, suggests that the Rudd/Gillard 
reforms of higher education are creating what Tierney describes as “a perfect storm” (2004, p. vii) in 
university governance. Concerned with effects of a student centred funding system on the 
employment of academic staff, he remarked that: 
This means as a whole, more, probably much more, than 50 per cent of all 
government spending on research is seriously influenced by the choices of 
our 17 – and 18-year-olds. (Lane & Puddy, May 17, 2012) 
Universities are therefore facing considerable dilemmas in how they address the nexus between 
teaching and research, identified in the Bradley Review as the core of a high quality education 
system, when excellence in teaching may well come at the expense of excellence in research or vice 
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 Such as the Course Experience Questionnaire (CEQ)  
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versa. This must occur simultaneously with meeting national priorities and international benchmarks. 
These dilemmas have increasingly played out in very public forums
13
 as it becomes apparent that 
institutions are strategically considering the performances of their staff and the way they position 
themselves in this domestic and international performance environment. 
  
                                                 
13
 For example proposed cuts in academic staff as The University of Sydney (Matchett, May 08, 2012), the Australian 
National University (Rowbotham, May 02, 2012) 
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